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As the war in Europe was winding down in the mid 1940s, while 
still in medical school, I remember being told by one of our 
professors, Dr J. Robert Willson, that we would be seeing 
national health insurance in America within "the lifetime of our 
practice of medicine." Was it prophesy based on crystal-ball 
gazing? Actually, he had just returned from a conference in 
Washington, DC where federal involvement in health care was 
discussed, and he was obviously impressed. 
By that time, Great Britain was well on the way toward 
establishing National Health Service (NHS). 1-4 The initial NHS 
proposal was brief and very broad. It was referred to as The 
White Paper and was only 85 pages long. The White Paper was 
originally written to be "attractive, lucid .. .free from verbal 
ambiguity ... " and, of course, free of controversy. This can be 
accomplished only by omitting details relating to such items as 
organization, health centers, hospital and special services, staff-
ing, distribution of doctors, and home care, to name a few. 
Briefly, the White Paper started with four major proposals,3 
which hardly sounded like socialized medicine. 
1. Freedom to use or not use facilities; no compulsion into 
service either for patient or doctor. 
2. Freedom for people to choose their own medical advisers. 
3. Freedom for doctors to pursue their professional methods 
in their own individual way. 
4. The personal doctor-patient relationship was to be pre-
served and the whole service founded on the concept of the 
family doctor. 
In charge would be the Minister of Health, responsible directly 
to the Parliament. Available to him or her would be two statutory 
Central Health Service Councils (one for Scotland and one for 
Great Britain proper) made up of doctors, nurses, dentists, and 
pharmacists. The latter entity had no executive powers and its 
duty was to render advice on technical and professional aspects, 
reporting only to the Minister of Health. 
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Very shortly and as expected, deviation from earlier stated 
principles occurred in all areas. The bureaucracy expanded 
relentlessly. The Central Medical Council, started as two, be-
came six in a matter of weeks. At every level administrative 
bodies were established. The freely elected Central Medical 
Boards became more and more appointed. Proposals for hospi-
tals expanded to 40 proposals. There was a plethora of confusing 
statements like "NHS is not a matter of poverty and wealth," that 
"it was not for charity." "Everyone would pay for a service for 
everyone by taxation" in part through Social Security Insurance 
contributions, but "there would be no charge for the services." 
One member of the House of Lords said the governmental 
intentions were honorable, but "good intentions were not good 
enough," and that the White Paper was written "without suffi-
cient knowledge. "4 Another member of the House indicated that 
"the establishment of a medical inspectorate ... [was] ... not very 
dissimilar from a medical Gestapo."4 Nevertheless, NHS came 
into being with federalization of hospitals, doctors, dentists, 
nurses, others, etc, in early summer of 1948. Thus, from the 
beginning, the primary decision for socialized medicine was 
made and any salesmanship was for the purpose of obtaining 
cooperation, primarily from physicians and the British Medical 
Association. Doctors, of course, had no choice as to their 
participation, although at one point a threat to boycott was made 
by doctors.5 
In the United States, President Clinton is not the first president 
to propose a national health care plan. There were proposals in 
the early 1930s, followed periodically by proposals in the mid 
40s, mid 60s, early 70s, late 80s6 and now, recently, 1994. 
President Roosevelt in 1945, in his annual message on the State 
of the Union, declared, "adequate medical care" to be one of the 
"basic human rights." The battle cry of the extremists was that 
national health insurance is "socialism and communism worthy 
of inciting to revolution."7 Ten months later, in a special mes-
sage to Congress, President Truman recommended that this 
right be made effective through National Health Insurance and 
related measures.7 It was the first time in American history that 
a full-length presidential message dealt solely with health care. 
The reactions of Americans were mixed. Some spoke of it as a 
"milestone in health care progress." Others were in disbelief that 
Truman would propose socialized medicine. Characteristic over 
the decades will be the pattern of what occurred thereafter. 
Congress followed up in 1947 with two proposals. One entitled 
National Health Insurance and Public Health Act of 1947 
(Senate Bill 1320) introduced by Democrat Senators Wagner, 
Murray, Pepper, Chavez, Taylor and McGraff.8 The other, at the 
same time, is the National Health Act of 1947 (Senate Bill545) 
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introduced by the Republican Senators Taft, Ball, and Donald.9-10 
The primary difference regarding NHI is always whether the 
government does or does not have the right to exercise any 
supervision or control over the administration of health care, 
personnel, maintenance, or operation of the state plans devel-
oped. Neither measure passed (congressional gridlock?). How-
ever, a multitude of health care proposals continued to be 
introduced over the years contributing to changes in the practice 
of medicine. It is difficult to name all the proposals, much less 
in chronological order. Many fell by the wayside before or 
shortly after introduction; others took years to implement or 
were subsequently modified. However, the following is an 
attempt to demonstrate the influence of the federal government 
on the practice of medicine. 
The need for more hospital beds throughout the country was 
recognized. In the 40s, indigent people were taken care of 
primarily by state and city hospitals. There were about a million 
government beds while the private or voluntary beds numbered 
close to 400,000. To deal with this situation, the Hill-Burton Bill 
was proposed and passed. For construction of hospitals, federal 
funding on a matching basis became available to states. The 
change in the need for private hospitals came about because Blue 
Cross, started in the mid 30s, became established a decade 
later.7·9 This enabled many people, previously considered 
indigents, to go to private hospitals. The Philadelphia General 
Hospital, a 2,500-bed city hospital, experienced a drop in acute 
care patients noticeably by the late 40s. Within the next three 
decades the previously unthinkable happened, the famous hos-
pital closed. 
The motivation for governmental concern has been the un-
mitigated rising cost of medicine. 11 - 18•21 -26 The medical literature 
is replete with this issue into the 70s and 80s with such adjectives 
as spiraling,fantastic, soaring, astronomical, and uncontrolled. 
The doctors, hospitals, labor, and pharmacists were blamed. In 
the 50s, health care workers were getting very low wages and 
began to demand higher wages. In Hawaii, the workers were 
seeking wage parity with California, which was 2 to 4 times 
higher. Nationwide, labor stated unequivocally that they would 
not relent on the issues of wages. Meanwhile, the physicians' 
fees were very low at that time, $5 to $10 a visit, and had to 
increase. The cost of drugs started to rise. There seemed to be an 
explosion of technology in various areas of medicine providing 
new services, many not inexpensive. Advances in instrumenta-
tion, equipment, and specialized technical services were expen-
sive. In Hawaii, hospital-bed rates and associated service charges 
meanwhile had risen three times faster than wages. 17 
In 1966, Medicare and Medicaid were passed. For many of the 
hospitals, this was to be the beginning of about 15 years of 
financial difficulties with rising costs on one hand and increas-
ing governmental restrictions on reimbursement on the other. 18-
23·25·27-30·36-43 The government started with a proposal that hospital 
administrators make some effort to control costs internally. A 
range of measures were addressed such as waste management, 
energy management, preventive maintenance, food service, 
efficiencies in operation, and use of generic drugs rather than 
proprietary drugs, to name a few. Then came cost contain-
ment. 18-19 One of the early regulations was reimbursement based 
on "cost or charges, whichever was higher." A nursing home in 
Hawaii eliminated central air conditioning and substituted indi-
vidual room air conditioners with increased cost. Needless to 
say, this particular regulation was not widely publicized and 
lasted a very short time. Other proposals continued and prospec-
-
tive reimbursement guidelines covered even wider areas such as 
physical therapy, rural hospitals, respiratory treatment, etc. As 
part of All-inclusive rate reimbursement (a precursor of DRG), 
diseases were separated into three general categories: medical, 
surgical, and obstetrics. Criteria were established for length of 
stay for different diseases. Utilization review became an impor-
tant function in hospitals with attention to documentation in 
medical records by attending physicians. Notes in charts on 
treatment and patient progress were scrutinized by insurance 
clerks to justify every day of hospitalization. Based on this, at 
times, there was retroactive denial of payment for excessive 
days of hospitalization. To appeal for payments for those days, 
lengthy medical explanation needed to be submitted. This ap-
pears to fit in with the attitude, "If voluntary effort fails, cost 
controls will follow."25 By the early 80s, a number of hospital 
closures had occurred. 30 
When disease-related group (DRG) reimbursement was pro-
posed by Medicare in September of 1983 under the Reagan 
administration, there was to be fixed payment for each illness. 27-
30 Since about 40% of the hospitals' total revenue was Medicare, 
the fear of bankruptcy was still foremost in the minds of the 
hospital administrators (facetiously, "Da Revenue's Gone"). 30 
Under considerable pressure, the hospitals undertook various 
measures to avoid bankruptcy.30 They laid off workers and 
stopped hiring. Then some hospitals, with advice from consult-
ing firms, improved the coding to maximize Medicare reim-
bursement. Patients recently discharged to decrease utilization 
were readmitted with a different diagnosis. When the govern-
ment discovered these measures, the hospitals and doctors were 
accused of collusion. Sanctions were instituted ifthere were any 
evidence of a second DRG, eg, abnormal laboratory studies 
detected in the first admission, payments for the second admis-
sion were denied. There were instances where physicians were 
deemed to beresponsibleforthecharges unless they had notified 
the patients properly, in writing, in advance. The hospital 
diversified into rehabilitation, long-term care, and home care for 
those patients who needed continued care beyond the allowable 
limits.30 Home care went from 15% in 1983 to 35% in 1990. 
Some hospitals even went into unrelated areas including travel, 
health clubs, and collection agencies, to name a few. (They also 
got into tax problems.) The hospitals also attempted to set up 
more complex, higher-paying conditions as, for example, open 
heart surgery. These services increased from 10.5% in 1983 to 
15.2% in 1991. The outpatient workload increased about 27% in 
1991. The percentage of hospital revenue from outpatient de-
partment increased from 13.4% in 1983 to 25% in 1992. Thus, 
instead of falling, revenues and profits increased from 1985. 
In 1956, the Relative Value System was being developed by 
various specialties in an effort to establish a logical, uniform 
method of determining fees. The Federal Trade Commission, in 
the mid 70s, had the antitrust section of the Justice Department 
look into RVS.31 -32 Needless to say, the physicians dropped 
RVS. From time to time, FTC continues to look into areas where 
fees are being established. 
Meanwhile, what is the status of Resource-Based Relative 
Value Scale system passed by Congress in 1992?33-35 RBRVS 
has a five-year phase-in period started in January of 1992. 
During this time, there are adjustments in fees with an increase 
of about 15% for those services that are underpriced, and during 
the same period, those fees that are higher will be reversed. 
RBRVS is complex with a number of factors brought into the 
establishment of fees, including volume, geographic variation, 
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specialty differentials, and peer review. Of course, self-referral 
will be disallowed. 
In the mid 70s when managed care was first proposed, it 
looked like NHI was just around the corner. 6.44-45 Carter derailed 
efforts toward NHI because he did not believe continuing rising 
costs could be controlled through NHI. He was right. Costs still 
have not come down, even with all the regulatory measures that 
have been put in effect through the years. At that time, managed 
care was "on the fringe of health care system." Today, it is very 
much the system. It is estimated that "three-quarters of the 
private practice physicians participate in at least one HMO, PPO 
or IPA contract...derive an average of about one-third of their 
revenue from managed care ... "36 It consists primarily of two 
components: the purchasers and the providers. 36-41 The former 
includes businesses, insurances, government, and any entity 
seeking medical service. The latter are the providers, mainly the 
hospitals and doctors. The purpose is, "best care at the most 
reasonable or lowest cost." The providers are involved in "finan-
cial risk sharing" through capitation. There is implication of 
rationing. Is there going to be "deliberate withholding of poten-
tially beneficial care?"46 To say that some form of rationing does 
not occur in the United States now is naive. In a recent article, 
the distinction between the term implicit rather than explicit is 
made. "Implicit rationing can be carried out in a variety of ways: 
by budget, as when capitated health plans limit certain services; 
by price, when services such as cosmetic surgery are not covered 
by health insurance; by queue, when certain services are not 
immediately available; by hassle, when administrative barriers 
facing physicians and patients deter the delivery of services; by 
insurance coverage; and by subtle social factors."46 
Ultimately, from the standpoint of patients, the change likely 
to occur is mainly the quality of service for two groups of 
patients: 
• Individuals with common, ordinary aches and pains, espe-
cially the conditions considered to be non-life threatening, 
or chronic. In Great Britain, the waiting period for care of 
these diseases in the different districts ranged from 2 1/2 to 
4 years depending on the district. The suffering is difficult 
to measure. 
• Those (generally the elderly) afflicted with advanced dis-
ease, cancer, stroke, Alzheimer's disease, or chronic pul-
monary disease to name a few, for which cure is extremely 
remote at best. Will the cost factor alter or even deny 
treatment of these patients? 
From the standpoint of physicians, will it be necessary to have 
gatekeepers and hatchet men? Will insurance companies or 
hospitals remove medical staff who do not comply? Apparently, 
this has occurred recently in Hartford, Connecticut, where a 
lawsuit was filed by patients and doctors against an insurance 
company.43 AMA has proposed the Patient Protection Act to 
assure fairness and accountability in the way insurance compa-
nies operate many of these plans. 36 Are the patients and doctors 
only pawns in this endeavor? Will the relationship between the 
patients and the doctors become one of estrangement? Who 
protects the doctors, controlled economically, without the free-
dom to practice medicine as they believe; yet, saddled with 
responsibility and accountability for following orders. Who 
protects him or her from the attorneys in the alcove? 
At the moment, it appears that managed care will keep the 
federal government at bay, or limited to the uninsured segment 
of the population. If the private sector, businesses, insurance 
companies, and hospitals can take care of health care at a profit, 
-
why would the federal government want to be involved with the 
kinds of costs involved in national health insurance? The irony 
is that all through the years, we were worried about federaliza-
tion of health care. 
I have always considered the expression of medical philoso-
phy to be caring and beautiful: Cure sometimes, help often, 
comfort always. Why does it now sound so discordant? Is it time 
for physicians to pause and reevaluate the situation? 
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